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n his essay "Situation and Suspicion in the Thought of
Merleau-Ponty: The Question of Phenomenology and Poli
tics," Merold Westphal argues that Merleau-Ponty's philoso
phy of ambiguity necessitates political complacency:
"Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, which in both
its early and later forms is a powerful synthesis of method and
ontology, has a minimal significance for his political writings"
(160). According to this argument, Merleau-Ponty is unable to
deduce a critical politics from his phenomenology of perception,
because the latter is a philosophy of ambiguity. For Merleau
Ponty, the structure of perception requires inexhaustible hori
zons of meaning. Due to the situated-ness of perception within
these horizons, ambiguity is required at the expense of absolute
1
meaning. Yet counter to Westphal, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy
of ambiguity not only rejects political complacency but also
justifies critical philosophy.
Through his rejection of epistemological foundationaHsffi,
Merleau-Ponty can achieve a politics that minimizes the terror
ism implicit in dogmatic political philosophy. When politics is
dominated by a vanguard group's monopoly on abstract Truth,
at the expense of the masses' lived experience, the progressive
politics of revolution become reactive terrorism. Vanguard poli
tics occurs with both liberalism's call for pure principled rational
ity and also Hegelian-Marxist dialectics that posit reason in
history. Only when political activity returns to the concrete level
of existence can grounds be opened for the critical politics of
revolution. Thus the philosophy of ambiguity not only provides
a powerful critique of the terrorism implicit in foundationalism,
it also creates new possibilities for revolutionary modality.
Westphal locates the disjunction between Merleau
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity and political theory around the
latter's hermeneutics of suspicion. In the spirit of Marx, Niet
zsche, and Freud, a hermeneutics of suspicion aims to uncover,
unmask, or demystify the 'forgetfulness' of self-deception. Yet
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity fails to demystify the
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horizons as is required for a hermeneutics of suspicion. Westphal
asks: "Is the philosophy of ambiguity, in either its earlier or later
version, a.critical philosophy in any meaningful sense?" (167). He
answers: "only minimally." According to Westphal, a philosophy
of ambiguity fails to show why dogmatism is a viable part of
political life. In de constructing the foundational tradition of abso
lute meaning, Merleau-Ponty loses the grounds needed for cri
tique. All meaning is within the shifting horizons of Being.
The situational character of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy
of ambiguity necessitates the existence of latent horizons of
meaning. Yet any hermeneutics of suspicion requires that the
repressed latency be made available given proper analysis. For
Freud, psychoanalysis can uncover the repressed unconscious.
Similarly for Marx, the proletariat gains class-consciousness of
their once-latent condition. In contrast, for Merleau-Ponty's phe
nomenology, we never overcome the ambiguity of situatedness.
The latent horizons of experience are the invisible, which make
the visible possible, and yet are always on the fleeting corners of
our experience.
By characterizing Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambigu
ity as complacency, Westphal misinterprets the very essence of
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Instead of seeking a
hermeneutics of suspicion to justify his critical politics, Merleau
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity is necessary for a critical poli
tics. By grounding his politics in a hermeneutics of suspicion, as
Westphal requires, Merleau-Ponty would negate the ambiguity
required for critical politics. Westphal has failed to acknowledge
the dynamic nature of the horizons of Being, and thus the critical
element therein.
This connection between a philosophy of ambiguity and a
critical politics is contained in Phenomenology of Perception, and is
2
only intensified in later works. Merleau-Ponty's early political
writings must be interpreted as a continuation of this common
theme, and not a hermeneutics of suspicion lacking proper philo
sophical grounding. This is especially important in reading Hu
manism and Terror, which seems most likely to flirt with the
absolute role of the proletariat. Concerning Merleau-Ponty's phi
losophy of ambiguity, Westphal states "the philosophy that
moves from being-in-the-world to Being as its ground (and
abyss), first in Heidegger and then in Merleau-Ponty, is estheti
cally but not politically fruitful" (178). This last clause, contrast
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ing politics with aesthetics, tips us off in the right direction.
I will demonstrate first that Merleau-Ponty's critique of
political dogmatism stems from his larger rejection of epistemo
logical foundationalism (I). Secondly, I will argue that through
such a critique, Merleau-Ponty makes possible radical politics of
revolution, not complacency (II). By redefining political engage
ment in terms of philosophy of ambiguity (I), Merleau-Ponty
creates new possibilities for revolutionary modality (II). Only
when his political theory is understood in conjunction with his
philosophy of ambiguity are radical politics possible.
I.
An understanding of the critical nature of Merleau-Ponty's phi
losophy of ambiguity requires a preliminary sketch of his rejec
tion of epistemological foundationalism, and its political counter
part of dogmatism. Westphal had argued that the most Merleau
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity could achieve was a critique of
political dogmatism, and yet could not even show why such
dogmatism was a viable part of political life.3 To the conrrary,
Merleau-Ponty's critique of dogmatism not only shows that it
gains a viable role through its connection with epistemological
foundationalism, but also that such a critique is a necessary
prerequisite for a critical politics of revolution. This latter claim is
h'ue because MerIeau-Ponty's critique breaks the status quo ter
rorism of vanguard party politics (based on foundational episte
mology) and reopens the horizons for the dialectic to solicit
revolutionary activity.
For Merleau-Ponty, political action, like perception, is
situated and thus does not lend itself to absolute judgments. In
his philosophy of ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty seeks to reject such
foundationalism's attempt to rranscend the situated character of
socio-natural eksistance, and make absolute judgments. The goal
of foundationalism's transcendence is to gain access to the pure
eidos of reality, because only therein apodicticity can be achieved.
Yet in such a process, concrete lived experience is negated in
favor of rational reflection. Situation is forgotten, and absrract
forms are posited as 'absolute.' In Phenomenologtj of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty rejects a long rradition of epistemological found a
tionalism, which seeks to subordinate lived-experience to ratio
nal reflection. Husserl sought to perform an epochi to bracket
lived-experience. The act of bracketing through rational reflec
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tion is to recover the essential structure of experience. HusserI's
apodicticity requires forfeiting the body, other selves, and the
world of lived-experience. In his Cartesian Meditations, HusserI
describes his method as uncovering" an all-embracing essentially
necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental subjec
tivity" (57). It is exactly this h'anscendental phenomenology,
which Merleau-Ponty rejects in Phenomenology ofPerception.
Political dogmatism is a natural outgrowth of foundation
alism because relativity threatens to contaminate the pure eidos.
In Phenonzenol0gtj of Perception Merleau-Ponty states "with cogito
begins that sh'uggle between consciousnesses each of which, as
Hegel says, seeks the death of the otller" (355). Stalin's view of a
vanguard party functions using the same foundationalist
paradigm as Kant, Heget and HusserI. Existential modality is
insufficient to bind individuals together. The only 'true' COlmec
tion is reflective and thus exclusive. Rational consciousnesses of
the privileged few (a vanguard/master) impose abstract truths
upon the concrete experiences of the masses, disguising the
situational nature of the former. Such an act is terrorism.
Terrorism can be defined as the introduction of absolute
forms into the content of inter-subjective lived-experience. Ter
rorism arises when the experiences of the masses are subjugated
to the absolute forms dictated by a vanguard party. One example
is writing history from a white male perspective, and characteriz
ing it as "natural" history. Such is an act of terrorism against
females and non-whites, whose history is considered secondary
and accessory. Such "natural" history terrorizes the lived
experience of the subordinate group.
In Sense and Nonsense Merleau-Ponty writes, lithe man
with the most exact awareness of the human situation is not the
master (since the master pretends ignorance of the foundations of
being and communication underlying the play of his despair and
pride) but the slave" (68). The master imposes a situational
perspective as absolute, rendering the lived-experience of the
slave irrational. Yet the slave is more firmly rooted in the world,
and possesses greater awareness of the horizons. The slave pos
sesses the "double consciousness" of DuBois, allowing for an
understanding of the interdependency of both the master and
slave. The slave understands his or her role both from the "slave"
perspective, and also from the perspective of the master. As the
master imposes his or her forms as absolute, in a corresponding
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act the forgotten horizons become charged. A tension grows as
the master moves further away from the horizons.
According to Merleau-Ponty, problems arise when the
dictatorship of the proletariat becomes a vanguar d-for-its elf. In
Humanism and Terror he states "the dictatorship of the proletariat
is not the will of a few officials who are the only ones initiated
into the secret of history, as in Hegel; it follows the spontaneous
movement of the proletariat in every country and relies upon the
instinct of the masses" (xix). Counter to Westphal's claims, dog
matism is a viable part of political life because it is an outgrowth
of epistemological foundationalism. A vanguard party in posses
sion of the logic of history will inevitably subject the life of the
masses to its will. Only through foundational legitimization can
such an act of terrorism be justified.
The critique of foundationalism, both epistemological and
political, is the cornerstone of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of
ambiguity. The phenomenon of foundationallsm is not as myste
rious as Westphal suggests. He requires that the self-deception of
foundationalism stem from a retrievable unconscious or a Will to
Power. However, foundationalism is simply an attempt to trans
form situated perspective into absolute law. By such a transfor
mation, a group can feel justified in political action due to apodic
ticity. Such an act is reactive in nature because it seeks to mold an
atemporal logic to history and is unable to account for the di
verse, the ambiguous, and the "irrationaL"
Political dogmatism leads to reactive politics and alien
ates the concrete experiences of the masses. By revealing the
situated nature of foundational epistemology, Merleau-Ponty
breaks the status quo terrorism of the vanguard party and re
opens the horizons of change. Because I am situated, and thus
incomplete, I can have being-for-others. The moment I posit
myself as essential, as cogito, or as a monad, I am cut off from
others, from my world, and from my body. Only in the absence
of apodicticihj is reciprocity possible. My situation is within the
hermeneutics of Being, and thus foundationalism is an impossi
ble venture. Merleau-Ponty states "universality is only con
ceived, it is not lived" (H. T., 116). The only means to minimize
terror is to embrace the horizons of situated-ness, and keep the
dialogue open. The vanguard cannot empathize with the prole
tariat's experience because it seeks to dominate it. The vanguard
seeks divinity but in the process forgets its humanity. Thus we

REVOLUTIONARY MODALITY

11

must not conceive of Merleau-Ponty's politics as separate from
his phenomenology, as both share a common ambiguity. His
political theory furthers the attack on foundationalism, because
application of foundational principles to politics leads to conser
vatism. Only upon return to the ambiguity of the concrete can a
radical politics of revolution form without the conservative ter
rorism of vanguard foundationalism.
II.
Westphal had argued that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambi
guity justifies situation instead of denouncing it, and thus cannot
maintain a critical politics. To the contrary, the absence of ambi
guity, sought by foundationalism, denies critical politics in favor
of dogmatism. However, philosophy of ambiguity goes beyond
mere critique by offering a critical politics of revolution.
By rejecting the inherent terrorism of foundationalism,
Merleau-Ponty reopens the ground for critical activity. Being, not
logic, compels us to adopt revolution, and ambiguity saves it
from terrorism. Only through solicitation from situation, from
flesh, and from Being, can the individual gain the critical per
spective necessary for revolulionary modality. As will be demon
sh'ated, Westphal's statement that Merleau-Ponty' s philosophy
of ambiguity is esthelically but not politically fruitful" contains
the deepest element of truth. Only when politics has been rede
fined aesthetically, can we overcome the terrorism of foundation
alism and achieve a critical politics of revolution.
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty states,
"what I understand never quite tallies with my living experience,
in short I am never quite at one with myself" (347). The horizons,
which Westphal calls 'self-deception,' shape meaning. The invisi
ble allows us to see the visible. We do not see the invisible, but
see because of it. Counter to Westphal's claim, the positing of
non-the tic horizons is not an act of bad faith, but a necessary part
of experience. Merleau-Ponty's rejection of foundationalism's I =
I redefines the I as being-in-the-world. As a being-in-the-world, I
encounter a world molded by humanity and a world containing
traces of II other selves." By placing the first inter-subjective con
tact in the perceptual world of lived-experience, Merleau-Ponty
avoids foundationalism's exclusionist tactics of positing others
on a transcendental level. All meaning is given within the world,
and abstract principles of the Kantian-Husserlian sort are contin
/I
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gent and immanently plagued by lived-experience. MerIeau
Ponty states "between my consciousness and my body as I
experience it, between this phenomenal body of mine and that of
another as I see it from the outside, there exists an internal
relation which causes the other to appear as the completion of the
system" (PhP, 352). Other selves are a pre-given part of my
lived-experience, and not the bracketed objects of reflection in
HusserI's transcendentalism. Thus, such a phenomenology of
perception does not encounter the problems plaguing founda
tional inter-subjectivity and its inherent terrorism of exclusion.
Meaning is based on the primacy of perception, as
Merleau-Ponty states lithe social is already there when we come
to know it and judge it" (PhP, 362). As in Gestalt psychology, the
forms are not absolute but derived from the horizons. Meaning
can be stabilized but never formalized. Applying Merleau
Ponty's phenomenology of perception to politics, the forms of
political activity (the abstract principles) are inseparable from the
matter of political activity (the concrete lived-experiences). As
Merleau-Ponty states, the matter is pregnant with form. Yet the
vanguard (the form) is inseparable from the proletariat's embod
ied experience in the world (matter). The proletariat's experience
has its own meaning (form), although such is deemed insufficient
in the vanguard's quest for the eidos.
Like perceptual meaning, political meaning forms within
our experience. In Sense and Nonsense, MerIeau-Ponty states "all
several men need to do is live together and be associated with the
same task for some rudimentary rules and a beginning of law to
emerge from their life in common" (118). Meaning takes place
within experience, and not on some transcendental level outside
of experience. We encounter forms within lived-experience, yet
not the absolute forms sought after by the epochi. The above
passage illustrates the connection between Merleau-Ponty's phi
losophy of ambiguity and his critical politics. Within the horizons
of ambiguity political meaning is inescapable, even if it is not the
apodicticity of dogmatic foundationalism.
For both the perceptual and the political, meaning is
derived from the ambiguity of situation. Sense is derived from
Nonsense, as is the Visible from the Invisible. Meaning is given in
a world surrounded by horizons, as Merleau-Ponty states in
Humanism and Terror, one does not become a revolutionary
through science, but out of indignation" (11). Yet how can we
II
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undertake a critical politics if all action relies on situation, and
situated perspective is contingent? Does this ambiguity not con
demn us to inactivity due to limited perspective?
Due to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity, inter
subjectivity is derived from situated being-in-the-world and not
transcendental Egology. The problem with the latter's inter
subjectivity is its a priori definition of legitimate subjectivity, and
thereby its exclusion of 'irrational' subjects. Vanguard leadership
is derived from such exclusionist inter-subjectivity. Merleau
Ponty's dismissal of vanguard leadership, due to his rejection of
foundationalism, makes true responsibility possible. Also, revo
lutionary modality is no longer an act of transcendental will, but
a process that requires other selves and Being. And therein
critical politics of revolution is possible. The mistaken dilemma is
that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity leads to either
political complacency or the amoralism of Nietzsche's unprinci
pled Clbermensch. Yet, just because history has not been won in
Heaven or in a primordial battle of the gods, this need not
condemn us to the dilemma between amoralism and compla
cency.
The revolution gives no 'pure' motives, our conunitment
is never absolute. It is always an activity counter-balanced by
doubts, by fears, and by uninviting material conditions. In effect,
the workers have more to lose than their chains. In Pllenomenologtj
of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states lIalthough I can will myself to
adopt a course of conduct and act the part of a warrior or a
seducer, it is not within my power to be a warrior or a seducer
with ease and in a way that 'comes naturally'i really to be one
that is" (436). My project is more than my will alone; it requires
my situation. Without an inviting situation, we become Don
Quixote willing himself a Knight in a world without chivalry.
Thus I am not Sartre's monad of freedom; I am bound by my
past, by the present, and by others around me in my world.
Freedom is freedom-in-a-situation, and thus it is difficult
to become a revolutionary in a time of peace and prosperity.
Concerning the arrival of meaning within experience, Merleau
Ponty states lias Gestalt psychology has shown, there are for me
certain shapes which are particularly favorable, as they are for
other men... " (PhP, 440). Like perceptual gestalts, the revolution
ary shape forms for the oppressed. It is "natural" for them to
"see" revolution as viable activity; their horizons of Being present
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a revolution to-be-achieved.
To state 'the oppressed masses will eventually revolt'
means neither pure reflective will nor mechanical necessity. To
prove that revolution should be undertaken is not like proving a
mathematical equation. I-the-oppressed exist in a situation that
"naturally" lends itself to revolutionary consciousness. What I
make of such natural inclinations is up to me, yet they are
there-to-be-intended. Even if I deny them, I still take up a posi
tion in response to them; in this case, that of denial. Through
external persuasion I can learn to see the gestalt shapes differ
ently, but never as pure free will. Even this process of learning
requires my pre-existing situation.
The revolution is not something to be entered into lightly,
because my horizons must be inviting. Far from Westphal's
notion of static horizons of ambiguity, the horizons are the
necessary source of revolutionary persuasion. As the master
forgets the horizons in favor of abstract eidos, the neglected
horizons become charged. The slave cannot forget his or her
material existence, as can the master. Despite the ambiguous
horizons of the slave's experience, the slave remembers situation.
And as the master moves further away from situation, the slave's
horizons become ever more charged with forms of revolution.
Only through tlle horizons of Being can revolutionary
modality be made possible. My status as a revolutionary requires
reciprocity by my fellow revolutionaries and my world. Much
like Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, who requires an invitation
from God, my situation and my fellow persons must elect me as
a revolutionary. I must be able to "play their language game"
through a common reservoir of lived experience and a common
situation. I must have the ability to view the world as "naturally"
ripe-for-revolution. Being solicits me to become part of the revo
lution, serving as the background for my activity. In effect, I must
believe in the revolution.
Westphal's problem with the ambiguity of situated-ness
has not been resolved because no source of judgment has been
established. However, it is absolutely essential that such ambigu
ity persists, and that the epochi is rendered impossible. Without
ambiguity, dogmatic terrorism is inevitable. Only when the con
crete experience of the non-vanguard element is embraced with
its ambiguity can terrorism be minimized. Unlike the vanguard,
embodiment always contains traces of doubt, fear, and uncer
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tainty, and such are necessary to avoid terrorism. True responsi
bility requires an openness to change, to ambiguity, and to
pluralism. In Humanism and Terror, Merleau-Ponty states "the
point is that we are not spectators of a closed history; we are
actors in an open history, our praxis introduces the element of
construction rather than knowledge as an ingredient in the
world" (92). Only when an embodied revolutionary group acts
without presumptuous notions of foundational apodicticitlj, can
they open themselves to new horizons and thus achieve genuine
responsibility.
The meaning of history is phenomenological, not logical.
We enter the revolution through the gradual solicitation of our
situation, and not through an all-encompassing willful act nor a
predetermined material position. We begin with vague expecta
tions, such as change or better living conditions. Most do not
enter the revolution seeking to kill the king or following a step
by-step blueprint for building utopia. We see ourselves in terms
of our immediate concrete lived-experience, not as the represen
tative of the world proletariat class. Yet as we become more
involved, we begin to see the bigger picture. We learn the names
and lives of others who share our misfortune. In this initial
unreflective openness with others, the reciprocity of empathy
presents itself. We ek-sist with others upon a common horizon of
Being.
The transformation into a revolutionary remains gradual,
and is always dependent upon this openness to the horizons of
Being. In absence of such opelmess, vanguard mentality is intro
duced, and becomes a conservative force within the revolution
ary bloc. In Phenomenologt} of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states
"the revolutionary movement, like the world of the artist, is an
intention which itself creates its instruments and its means of
expression" (445}.The process of revolutionary modality is grad
ual. Much like the artist, one begins with vague notions, and
never a detailed formula. As we move along, we become further
enticed and further engaged. We begin to see our own struggle
within a larger movement, which is made possible through a
common horizon of Being. As in the work of art, every stroke
defines the whole, and the whole every stroke.
Like the artist, it is important that we are open to the
horizons of Being at every moment, which might take us in an
unexpected direction. We must follow the feeling of inspiration,
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and not subject free movement to the confines of rationality.
Political activity, like aesthetics, must be defined for what it is:
concrete lived-experience, not an exact science. Thus Merleau
Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity, in its perpetual openness to
Being, supports a radical and critical politics. Vanguard politics,
on the contrary, dogmatically clings to history's eidos, and be
comes reactive and conservative in its complacency.
Counter to Westphal's notion of the invisible horizons of
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity, meaning is necessary
and radical change is possible. Despite the inherent impossibility
of exhausting the meaning of our horizons, such an act of recov
ery is impossible not because of deception, but because of the
thetic/non-thetic relationship. The thetic interweaves with the
non-thetic to form an irreducible system of lived experience.
History has a gestalt-seeking equilibrium, which embraces this
relationship. If the vanguard distances its forms from the lived
experience of the oppressed (with whom it forms a necessary
system), the tension will erupt into revolution. One example is
the American Civil Rights movement, which was the result of a
long-standing forgetfulness by the White population in America.
This "master/vanguard" group neglected the lived-experience of
a large segment of American life. Thus this abstraction of forms
charged the horizons of Black America, soliciting them to radical
politics.
Like all forms of expert behavior,4 revolutionary modality
is more a matter of knowing-how than of knowing-that. My
knowing-that revolution is a possibility is derived from my
knowing-how the fields of oppression are presented through lived
experience. The truth of the revolution can never be verified. Yet
only once we break ourselves of foundationalism's quest for
apodicticity, and instead view revolutionary involvement like the
work of the artist, can we achieve the openness necessary for
responsible revolutionary modality. Like judging aesthetic inter
pretations, we can still judge interpretations of revolutionary
situations as "better" or "worse." Some calls for revolution may
be deemed "unripe" or "superficial." We are able to avoid the
dilemma between complacency and nihilism, even without an
absolute measuring stick of history. History's gestalt seeks a
point of equilibrium that uses revolutionary politics to counter
balance foundationalism's forgetfulness.
Even if the proletariat or any other revolutionary group is

REVOLUTIONARY MODALITY

17

not ordained by the divine logic of history, nevertheless they are
solicited by their embodied humanity. Revolution can minimize
terrorism through openness to the horizons of Being. Such open
ness allows for the perpetual movement of the dialectic and also
for the dismissal of vanguard politics. The revolutionaries must
keep an opelmess amongst themselves in order not to create a
universal revolutionary category. Such a category would negate
racial, ethnic, gender, and religious differences, and limit the
movement of history.
As has been demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy
of ambiguity warrants critical politics. Reciprocity of the flesh is
made possible only once human relations are re-grounded from
their abstract position allotted by traditional philosophy.
Thereby, exclusive categories of the "irrational" (Le., women,
non-Whites, non-Christians) are ended. Politics becomes a matter
of shared situational perspective and openness to the horizons of
Being, not a search for historical apodicticitlj.
HamUne UniversihJ
NOTES
1 The ambiguity of situated-ness results from three interrelated factors.
The subject does not constitute the object prior to perception (i.e., as an
ego). The subject derives meaning from a pre-existing socio-natural
world. And the subject lacks an 1=1 relationship to itself, because only
as being-in-the-world does it relate to itself.
2 I will concentrate on his philosophy of ambiguity as offered in his
early works (1945-1947). These will include Phenomenology ofPercep
tion, Sense and Nonsense, and Humanism and Terror. I believe the
themes of ambiguity, made most explicit in his later writings, are
implicit in the earlier writings and can be derived from them. The later
works intensify his earlier project. Humanism and Terror comes closest
to supporting vanguard politics when read apart from Merleau-Ponty's
larger phenomenological project.
3 Without the unconscious of Freud or the Will to Power of Nietzsche,
Westphal argued that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity lacked
a source of such repressive activity other than the vagueness of "Being."
4 See Hubert Dreyfus. What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of
Artificial Reason. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
REFERENCES
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phe
nomenology. Dorion Cairns, trans. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1999.

18

ANDREW THOMAS LAZELLA

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology ofPerception. Colin Smith,
trans. New York: Routledge, 1999.
- . Sense and Nonsense. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus,
trans. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
- . Humanism and Terror: The Communist Problem. John O'Neill,
trans. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000.
Westphal, Merold. "Situation and Suspicion in the Thought of
Merleau-Ponty: The Question of Phenomenology and Politics."
Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, Galen A. Johnson and
Micahel B. Smith, eds. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1990, 158-179.

